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Introduction 
A provision in the 2008 Farm Bill established the National Institute for Food and Agriculture 
(NIFA). Within this institute, a new competitive grant research program named the Agriculture and 
Food Research Initiative has replaced the National Research Initiative Competitive Grant Program. 
The Secretary of Agricultural has recently drawn attention to a new research emphasis for NIFA: 
food production and sustainability, improved nutrition and ending child obesity, food safety, biofuels 
and energy, climate change and the environment. In addition, a new NRC-NAS report on “A New 
Biology for the 21st Century” has shed light on using the new biology to meet societal challenges in 
food, environment, energy and health.  
The new direction of NIFA will be reflected in upcoming requests for research proposals 
(RFPs) for the new Agricultural and Food Research Initiative (AFRI). Congress has provided NIFA 
$262.5 million for FY 2010, which is a 30% increase over FY 2009 level (for the NRI) and more than 
double the amount of five years ago.  Dr. Roger Beachy, who is the new Director of NIFA, and his 
staff indicate that the new funding initiatives will emphasize “focus, scale, and impact.” Secretary of 
Agriculture Vilsack has set the broad agenda for NIFA with an emphasis on food production and 
sustainability, improving nutrition and ending child obesity, food safety, biofuels and energy, climate 
change and the environment.  
In a December news release, the Director of NIFA indicated that NIFA expects to fund much 
larger grants than in the past—some grants are expected to be in the neighborhood of $2 million over 
five years, as opposed to past practices of funding grants at the $100,000-150,000 level over two 
years. The release also indicated such research initiatives would most likely require multi-disciplinary 
teams of scientists, and significantly fewer awards would go to single-scientist projects or to two 
scientists from a single discipline.  Moreover, with Obama’s focus on obtaining greater impact from 
all types of federally funded research, NIFA will be looking for research proposals that provide a 
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broad set of benefits to the U.S. and developing countries. In addition, the USDA is planning to use 
its research, education and extension institutions to help translate research discoveries from its funded 
projects into real solutions for real people.   
New research challenges have been raised in a recent NRC-NAS publication, A New Biology 
for the 21st Century: Ensuring the United States Leads the Coming Biology Revolution. The charge to 
the NRC committee that authored this report was to find solutions to major societal needs—
sustainable food production, protection of the environment, renewable energy, and improvement in 
human health. In particular the NRC committee recommending that U.S. research institutions set big 
goals, and then let the problems of attaining these goals drive the scientific research agenda. To 
provide additional perspective from this report, consider the four main recommendations: 
a. A national initiative established to accelerate the emergence and growth of the new 
biology to achieve solutions to societal challenges in food, environment, energy and 
health; 
               b.   A new national biological initiative be an interagency effort, that it have a time line 
                       of at least a decade, and that its funding be an addition to the current budget; 
c. Priority should be given to the development of the information technologies and 
        sciences that will be critical to the sciences of the new biology; and 
d. Devote resources to programs that support the creation and implementation of 
        interdisciplinary curricula, grad student training programs, and educational  
        training needed to create and support the new biologists. 
 
 Integration is an essential feature of the new biology addressed by the NRC Report. For 
example, major subdivisions of biology will be expected to collaborate with scholars from physics, 
chemistry, computer science, engineering, mathematics and economics. A joint research effort 
attempting to research new depths of understanding and new applications will need to draw upon 
scientists from universities, government agencies and the private sector and funding from the 
government and private sector.  To function well in the new biology, scientists will need to excel in 
their own field but also to be knowledgeable enough to work with scientists from other fields of 
science.   
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 The objective of this paper is to shed new light on principal-agent problems in the new 
science for agriculture. Agency problems arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric 
information when a principal hires (contracts) with an agent to undertake some activity for her. 
Asymmetry information describes the situation where one of the two parties has better information 
than the other or they have different information. This creates an imbalance of power in contracting, 
which frequently leads to undesirable outcomes. The two main information problems are adverse 
selection and moral hazard. With adverse selection there is incomplete information before the 
principal and agent reach a contract, e.g., the agent knows more about his characteristics than the 
principal and this information weighs against the principal’s objective. Moral hazard arises when an 
agent changes his or her behavior after obtaining a contract, e.g., shirks, but this information is not 
apparent to the principal and therefore reduces her expected payoff. More specifically, adverse 
selection in research can arise if a scientist writes well or is inherently good at writing research 
proposals (“telling a good story”) but does not have the complete set of research skills to achieve the 
full potential once the project is underway. Moral hazard arises when the agent changes his or her 
behavior after obtaining a grant award, he or she then becomes less diligent or slacks off. Information 
problems associated with adverse selection and moral hazard are greatest in one-time relationships or 
contracts, but they may be partially or completely ameliorated in multi-period, repeated contracting. 
Externally funded research is perhaps best described as scientists having a short-term relationship 
with a research funding agency or program manager. 
 In the first section of the paper, I address incentives for implicit contracting in a setting where 
one scientist undertakes a single project. However, the effort of the scientist and the research output 
are not contractible because they cannot be enforced by an independent third-party. In the second 
section, incentive issues in team research are examined. First, communication issues arise in multi-
disciplinary team research; there is a need for the team to find a common language, accepted research 
methods, and agreed upon style. Second, with asymmetric information on effort, a free- easy-rider 
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problem exists among team members, i.e., individual scientist want to obtain the payoff for a 
successful project, but each of them individually has an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of others. 
Mutual shirking then undermines the potential success of the research project. I show that when 
agents are risk neutral and otherwise relatively homogeneous, a hierarchy of incentives and ranking 
among scientists is critical to the success of a project. Another central decision is whether to use 
relative performance evaluation or joint performance evaluation of members of a team, and the 
optimal scheme is sensitive to the likely length (one time or repeated many times) of the contracting 
relationship. For optimal assignment of more than one scientist to a task, I show that effort levels of 
agents must have synergy, a type of complementary interaction. Moreover, asymmetric information 
on pre-existing social status can complicate incentive setting for a team of scientists and potentially 
undermine the success of a project. One key conclusion of the paper is that competition among 
scientists has value only to the extent that it is used to reveal information; competition per se raises 
the uncertainty that scientists face in undertaking research. This translates into higher costs of 
research and reduced effort of risk averse scientists. The final section presents this and other 
conclusions. 
Incentives for Single Scientist Projects 
 In this section, I eexplore individual agent based incentive schemes. Huffman and Just (2000) 
address key issues in setting incentives for scientists who engage in research as a single investigator 
on a project. They apply principal-agent theory to derive optimal compensation schemes for scientists 
when scientists differ in ability, risk aversion, cost of effort, and reservation utility. These attributes 
of scientist turn out to be quite important in the contacting literature, but biological scientists may be 
quite unaware of their importance. For example, Huffman and Just show how the above attributes 
matter for optimal incentives and show the optimal trade-off between institutional risk and scientist’s 
abilities. In particular, they show how scientists’ incentives should be structured to elicit optimal 
research efforts and direction. 
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 R&D is a production process that has unusual attributes relative to the production and 
marketing of industrial goods. First, the R&D output is most accurately described as the “best” of 
scientists’ outputs, rather than their total output. Second, the research production process is subject to 
large amounts of ex ante uncertainty, including that the payoff or value of a research project is 
unknown at the outset of the project and ouput/quality is non-contractible. By this I mean that no 
contract can be written to cover all contingencies and no contract can be enforce by a dis-interested 
third-party. Third, asymmetric information exists on scientists’ effort. With uncertainty in the 
production process, there is no way that an administrator or contract officer can accurately infer effort 
allocated to a project and the scientist has the best available information about his own ability. 
Fourth, research administrators are less risk averse than scientists because they have a large pool of 
projects over which to diversify risk. 
 First, the research administrator is assumed to observe the research payoff at the end of a 
project, to compensate scientists for their effort, possibly with a compensation package including a 
fixed salary and a performance incentive, and to be risk neutral about R&D payoffs.  A research 
project is defined as an attempt to develop a particular innovation or a fixed term contract to conduct 
research in a particular area.  Moreover, an administrator’s task is to maximize expected R&D payoff 
net of scientists’ compensation. 
Second, scientists are assumed to obtain utility from income, disutility from effort or work, to 
be risk averse, and to have a reservation utility. Reservation utility reflects a shadow value on a 
scientist’s effort from using it in other activities, e.g., in home production, teaching, or contracting 
with another research administrator.  More specifically, each scientist (differentiated by the subscript 
i) is assumed to have a quadratic cost of effort, ci(ei) = .5kie
2
i (which generates a positive-
sloped effort schedule with respect to compensation), to have constant absolute risk aversion φi, to 
have a fixed certainty-equivalent reservation utility (μi), and to choose effort on research to maximize 
individual expected utility subject to attaining at least his reservation utility. Third, each scientist is 
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assumed initially to work alone (to avoid team or easy-rider incentive problems) and to undertake 
only one project per period that produces exactly one indivisible unit of output, but research quality is 
variable depending on effort.  Hence, the production function for quality has one variable input, the 
scientist’s effort.  Important to this incentive scheme is the fact that research ability, risk aversion, 
cost of effort and reservation utility differ across scientists and are known and used by administrators 
to determine compensation.1  
Because of the highly uncertain nature of research, the production function for research is 
stochastic, having a scientist-specific random component εi and a common institutional component δ. 
The scientist-specific component reflects factors other than scientist’s effort and ability, e.g., 
inspiration and luck.  The common shock is associated with working in the same research area and 
might represent unanticipated bureaucratic or scientific problems or unanticipated advances in the 
public stock of knowledge. The scientist observes the combined shock but does not distinguish 
between the components. Hence, the production function for research quality, which is the payoff to 
the principal or administrator, is 
(1)   yi  =  ai ei  + εi + δ , 
where yi is quality of research produced by scientist i, ei is scientist’s effort, and ai is the expected 
marginal product of the scientist’s effort.  Differences in ai across scientists reflects scientists’ 
abilities for research (e.g., creativity, efficiency of mental processes, and work routine), 
organizational aspects of the research environment (e.g., bureaucratization of procedures), and the 
available stock of relevant public knowledge.  The stochastic terms εi and δ in the payoff function are 
assumed to have a zero mean and fixed variance, σ
2
ε
i
 and σ2
δ
, respectively, where the variance of the 
scientist-specific shock differs among scientists; and for simplicity of presentation, εi and δ are 
                                                 
1 Administrators are assumed to accurately determine ability and other scientist-specific attributes without erro and thus 
without causing adverse selection. 
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assumed to be uncorrelated.  The variance of the research payoff is the summation of the two 
variances, ω2i  = σ
2
ε
i
+ σ2
δ
. 
A simplifying but plausible assumption is scientist’s effort, ei, is the only source of 
asymmetric information, i.e., differential information between the scientist and administrator.  It is 
unobservable to the research administrator but known to the scientist.  Research quality, yi, is 
assumed to be observable to both the administrator and scientist but only at the end of the project. 
Clearly, this is critical assumption, and quality may not be fully evaluated until a projects results are 
published and used by others.   
The current set of results was obtained for the circumstances where each scientist works 
independently, but there can be competition among scientists in that the highest quality output 
contributes to the administrator’s R&D payoff.  However, to convey some basic results about optimal 
compensation and the associated R&D payoff, consider contracting between a research administrator 
(or funding agency) and one scientist.  According to principal-agent theory, when contracting is 
repeated many times and the agent has discretion in actions including the level and timing of effort, 
the structure of the optimal pay scheme is linear in the observed principal’s payoff  (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1987).  This implies a two-part compensation scheme consisting of (i) a guaranteed 
salary, αi, that is independent of the observed R&D payoff, and (ii) an incentive payment that 
amounts to a positive share, βi, of the observed R&D payoff, 
(2)   wi = αi + βiyi. 
A larger βi implies a “higher powered” incentive scheme.  Substituting equation (1) into (2), 
the structure of this pay scheme is linear in the scientist’s effort, 
(3)  wi(ei) = αi + βiaiei + βiεi + βiδ. 
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Equation (3) depicts how ex ante uncertainty in the research production process is transmitted 
into ex ante income uncertainty for the scientist.  From equation (3), the expected wage conditional 
on effort is E[wi(ei)]= αi + βiaiei and the wage variance is V(wi)= β
2
i ω
2
i .  
Under the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion for utility of the scientist, his 
expected utility can be expressed in terms of certainty equivalence as  
(4)  E[Ui(ei)] = αi + βiaiei -.5kie
2
i -.5φiβ
2
i ω
2
i . 
The research administrator’s payoff net of scientist’s compensation is Πi=yi(ei) - wi(ei)=      
(1- βi )aiei + (1 - βi )(εi + δi) - αi.  Therefore, the expected net payoff is 
(5)  E(Πi) = (1-βi)aiei - αi. 
Clearly if 0≤βi<1,  then the expected net payoff of the research administrator is positively 
related to a scientists’ effort, ei, as in Levitt (1997), but also to scientists’ ability, ai.  However, the 
administrator’s expected net payoff is negatively related to the scientist’s guaranteed salary, αi. 
The administrator chooses the parameters of the incentive scheme, αi and βi, to maximize her 
expected net payoff subject to the constraints that the scientist chooses effort to maximize his 
expected utility and that the scientist attains at least his reservation utility, i.e.,  
(6)  max{(1-βi)aie
*
i -αi} 
       αi, βi 
subject to 
 
(7)  ei* = argmax {αi + βiaiei -.5kie
2
i -.5φiβ
2
i ω
2
i } , 
                  ei 
and 
(8)  αi + βiaie
*
i -.5ki(e
*
i )
2 -.5φiβ
2
i ω
2
i ≥μi.  
The administrator’s problem ensure that the scientist chooses a privately beneficial effort rate when 
faced with the compensation scheme (i.e., it is incentive compatibility to the scientist), and the 
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administrator offers a compensation package that the scientist will accept (i.e., it meets his 
participation or reservation constraint).2  
Because research risk is independent of effort in this model, the optimization problem in (6)-
(8) can be solved sequentially.  First, the optimal solution to the scientist’s decision on effort in 
equation (7) is 
(9)  e*i = βiai /ki , 
which depends positively on the scientist’s marginal product of effort (ai) and inversely on 
his marginal cost of effort (ki).  Second, substituting equation (9) into (6) and (8) and choosing 
αi and βi, Kuhn-Tucker conditions (or direct examination) reveal a boundary solution with 
E[Ui(e
*
i)] = μi in (8) implying: 
(10)  αi = μi -.5β
2
i (pi-ri) , 
where pi = a
2
i /ki is a scientist-specific “research productivity index” and ri = φiω2i  is a scientist-
specific “risk premium.”5  Substituting (10) into (6) and (8) and maximizing with respect to βi reveals 
the optimal scientist performance incentive, 
(11)  β*i  = pi /(pi+ri) , 
which, when substituted into (10), gives the globally optimal guaranteed payment or salary, 
(12)  α*i  = μi -.5p
2
i (pi-ri)/(pi+ri)2. 
With this optimal pay scheme, five notable results follow. First, the administrator chooses an 
incentive scheme to maximize the joint payoff of the administrator and scientist (the administrator’s 
gross payoff minus the scientist’s cost of effort and risk bearing) and both have an incentive to fulfill 
the contract.  Second, the administrator compensates the scientist for his effort at a rate that provides 
partial insurance against income risk.  With asymmetric information on the scientist’s effort, the 
administrator does not provide full-income insurance to the scientist because that would provide 
                                                 
2 In this model, it is unproductive for the administrator to offer a compensation scheme the scientist rejects because the 
administrator’s expected payoff is zero, i.e., E(yi) = 0. 
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weak incentives for effort, leading to shirking.  Third, the guaranteed salary of a scientist is positively 
related to his reservation utility μi, but his reservation utility has no impact on the incentive 
component.  Fourth, the optimal incentive, β*i , is negatively related to scientists’ risk premium, 
ri = ίiω
2
i , and the optimal salary or pay guarantee is positively related to scientists’ risk premiums if 
and only if 3pi > ri, which they are is plausible.6  In other words, low research risk, low scientist risk 
aversion, low cost of scientist’s effort, and/or high marginal research productivity is sufficient to 
cause the optimal salary guarantee to increase in the research risk.  If research is infinitely risky 
(i.e., ω2i →∞ ri→∞), β*i  = 0 and the optimal pay scheme is a fixed salary equal to the certainty-
equivalent utility (i.e., wi = α
*
i = μi).  In this case, the administrator optimally bears all the risk of the 
project because he is risk neutral and less risk averse than the scientist.  In fact, one finds that an 
increase in the scientist’s risk premium, ri, decreases the importance of the incentive relative to the 
salary or guarantee.  Fifth, scientists with a higher research productivity index, pi, receive higher 
optimal incentives, but lower optimal salary guarantees if the risk premium is small relative to the 
scientist’s research productivity.7  However, if a scientist’s risk premium is sufficiently high relative 
to scientist’s research productivity, the salary guarantee will be increasing in scientist’s research 
productivity. 
 To obtain further insights, note the optimal effort of scientists is 
(13)  e*i = aipi /[ki(pi + ri)] 
and expected compensation of the scientist net of his cost of effort is8 
(14)  E [ 22** )/(5.)]()( iiiiiiiii rprpecew ++=− μ , 
which is equal to the reservation wage plus the risk premium.  The expected R&D payoff for the 
research administrator net of the scientist’s compensation is  
(15) E[Πi (e
*
i )] = .5p
2
i /(pi + ri) - μi. 
If the scientist is risk neutral (i.e., φi = ri = 0), then equation (13) becomes ai/ki, equation (14) 
becomes μi, and equation (15) becomes .5pi - μi.  With asymmetric information on the scientist’s 
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effort, the scientist’s risk-averse attribute reduces the administrator’s payoff and the scientist’s effort 
from the first-best outcome.9 Some net R&D payoff (and research quality) is foregone by the 
administrator when she partially insures the risk averse scientist against risk.  Furthermore, given the 
scientist’s reservation wage, μi, the scientist must also receive higher net compensation because he 
must be paid to bear his part of the risk.  Because he is more risk averse than the administrator, the 
risk borne by the scientist is inefficient risk bearing.  Hence, only a “second-best” resource allocation 
is attainable. 
Equations (13), (14), and (15) reveal that a risk-neutral research administrator is better off 
contracting with scientists that have low scientist-specific research risk (i.e., σ
2
ε
i
 is small) and low risk 
aversion (i.e., small φi).  The reason is that such scientists require less compensation for bearing risk 
and exert more effort.  Differentiating E[Πi (e
*
i )] in (15) with respect to the scientist-specific research 
productivity index, pi, also reveals, not surprisingly, that a research administrator is better off 
contracting with a scientist who has a higher research productivity (more ability and lower 
opportunity cost).10 
Differentiating a scientist’s net compensation in equation (14) with respect to pi gives the 
result that, other things equal, scientists who have higher marginal products of effort (larger ai ) 
and/or lower opportunity cost of effort (ki) receive larger expected net compensation than those with 
lower scientist-specific research productivity.11  Differentiating (14) with respect to the scientist-
specific risk premium, ri, reveals  that ∂E[wi(e*i )-ci(e*i )]/∂ri > 0 if and only if pi >ri.12  Thus, 
among scientists with high research productivity relative to their risk premium (i.e., pi > ri), net 
compensation is higher as research becomes inherently more risky (i.e., σδ2 increases).  Also, those 
who are more risk averse or have greater scientist-specific variance in research output will receive 
larger expected net compensation, other things equal.  However, among scientists with low research 
productivity relative to their risk premium (i.e., pi < ri ), these conclusions are reversed. Perhaps, the 
result that scientists who have lower opportunity cost of effort (which makes pi higher) receive 
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higher compensation in the former case is surprising, but it is explained by the fact that such 
scientists are likely to give greater effort.  In the latter case, the result that scientists who have higher 
research risk earn greater compensation may be surprising, but it is explained by the fact that more 
compensation must be provided to induce such scientists to bear risk.  We note that this phenomenon 
may not be observed in reality because administrators tend not to hire or grant tenure to low-
productivity scientists. 
Peer-reviewed competitive grant programs shift an unduly large share of research risk onto 
scientists, who are in an inferior position for risk bearing.  This happens in several ways, including 
unfunded proposal writing, only a small fraction of proposals receive funding, repeat submissions are 
required, and funded proposal are underfunded relative to costs. Even for a “funded scientist,” 
projects may be prematurely terminated or delayed indefinitely.   
Within the principal-agent model of research incentives, low proposal funding rates and 
underfunding of successful proposals greatly weakens scientists’ incentive for effort, including 
proposal writing, and generally lowers the quality of research relative to optimal incentive 
contracting.  Thus, the principal-agent model predicts low quality research proposals for external 
competitive grants programs, especially when average awards are small. Hence, the proposed major 
increase in the size of NIFA funded grants may significantly increase proposal quality. However, this 
might best be achieved by implementing a two-step process. Short proposals could be submitted and 
evaluated for their likely long run payoff, and then a modest number of the most promising ones 
would be asked to prepare fully developed proposals upon which funding decisions would ultimately 
be based. This is a policy that has been tried in NIH.   
If funding of a scientist with a competitive grant is a one-time event, the expected payoff is 
often quite low, and the efficiency of the research granting process can be expected to increase when 
the principal and agent engage in repeat contracting over time and establish a long term relationship. 
Only under these circumstances can administrators be expected to gain the type of information on 
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scientists’ ability, degree of risk aversion and reservation utility needed for efficient contracting. Only 
in this way can problems stemming from asymmetric information be reduced incentives fine-tuned to 
the riskiness of the research and attributes of the scientist.  
When asymmetric information on scientists’ research productivities and risk premiums exists 
before contracting, i.e, the funding agency is trying to decide who to fund and the funding agency has 
less information than scientists, additional sources of inefficiency may arise.  For example, if the 
scientist knows his ability better than the funding agency and uses this information in deciding 
whether to accept a grant, then only less able scientists are willing to undertake a particular project at 
given cost, thus resulting in adverse selection (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p. 440-42).  This 
potential undoubtedly is a major reason why granting agencies invest heavily in effort and time 
consuming screening activities, i.e., requiring scientists to write lengthy proposals and frequently 
must reapply for funding, and use external reviewers of proposals and review panels to rank 
proposals.  However, screening activities reduce able agents’ welfare (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and 
Green, p.460-66).13  Signaling activities do not guarantee that more able scientists are made better off 
because they may be compelled to engage in a high level of costly signaling to distinguish themselves 
(Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p. 450-60).   
However, to the extent that funding agencies guarantee “renewal of successful” projects, they 
become less competitive and similar to a program funding mechanism.  For example, the tradition of 
the National Science Foundation has been to engage in extensive competition where the expected size 
of awards is small, but little competition or emphasis on the quality of research proposals where the 
expected size of the award is large.  These latter funds have been allocated largely to scientists who 
have compiled long-term successful research programs in the area where a large grant is to be made 
(see U.S. GAO for details). It will most likely be an efficiency improving step for NIFA to award 
larger grants over longer period of time.  
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Team Research and Incentive Issues 
 In this section, I explore incentive schemes to induce team production with two or more 
agents. Research projects that involve teams of scientists introduce new incentive problems. For 
example, successful completion of a project is a joint-effort and a public good to the team members. 
However, each team member has an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of the other team members, 
i.e., there is no way to identify a shirking agent when joint output is the only observable indicator of 
agents’ efforts. This gives rise to a free-rider or easy rider problem (Cornes and Sandler 1996; 
Holmstrom 1982) that grows as the size of the research team increases.   
 Second, research teams that span two or more disciplines encounter additional problems. 
Holding a Ph.D. degree in a field of science indicates that an individual has successfully mastered a 
body of knowledge and skills needed to advance the state of knowledge in a field of science. But the 
body of knowledge differs across fields and so frequently do research methods. Hence, a set of 
scientists across diverse fields must initially invest in establishing a common scientific vocabulary, 
work out agreed upon standards for evidence to support or refute hypotheses, and work out task 
assignments. This can be quite time consuming, especially for non-tenured faculty who are in a 
probationary period in which they must demonstrate substantial research publications and quality 
teaching in a five-year period. 
Development and Organization of Science to Facilitate Communication 
 By the 1600s, advancement of science settled on a building blocks approach. New discoveries 
(papers) build on the intellectual foundation of previous ones, and new papers acknowledge the input 
of prior papers through citation in the references. Moreover, advances in science are frequently held 
up because a key building block is incomplete, and this gives rise to frontiers of science advancing at 
different rate and even in a particular field of science, the pace of advances at the frontier varies over 
time. As the stock of knowledge has grown new fields of science have been borne and the depth of 
understanding in each existing field has increased.  
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 Citations serve a number of purposes. They acknowledge the prior work of others or building 
blocks, direct the reader to additional related sources of information, acknowledge conflicts with 
other results, and provide support for views expressed. Furthermore, citations place a paper or 
discovery within its scientific context and assign responsibility if errors should later be discovered. 
Currently, journals, books, and informal arrangements are important channels of scientific 
communication. The relative importance of each channel has changed over time and this change is 
partly associated with the size of the total stock of knowledge and the pace of advances in science 
(Huffman and Evenson 2006, p. 52-53). 
 The organization of science and technology in the agricultural research and development 
system can be given a matrix representation (Huffman and Evenson 2006, p. 51).  Also, see figure 1. 
The system consists of six simultaneous ongoing levels or layers of activity with vertical (upstream 
and downstream) and horizontal feedback and linkages. Level III contains products from innovation. 
Level I identifies the final users of new technologies, who are also a source of information about 
technology needs and problems. Level II is the source for final users in the public and private 
information systems. Level II refers to the commercialized technologies and knowledge that are the 
products of applied research. Level IV, technology invention, identifies the engineering and applied 
science fields that generate new technologies. Level V, pre-invention research, is directed specifically 
toward producing discoveries that advance the knowledge needed to design new technology and 
institutions. It is linked upstream to Level VI, to the fundamental or core sciences and down-stream 
to Level IV technology inventions. A distinction between Level V and VI is that research in the Level 
V fields tends to be demand driven and in Level VI research tends to be supply or scientist driven. 
 Level IV activities are those public and private applied research effort directed toward the 
discovery or invention of new technologies. These include mechanical, chemical, biological, 
managerial, and policy technologies. Much of public invention is in the technology fields where 
intellectual property rights are not marketable and therefore do not simulate private invention.  The 
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distinction between technology invention (Level IV) and pre-invention (or pre-technology) science 
fields (Level II) is important because the products of pre-invention research are not generally subject 
to patent protection.  Pre-invention science means research directed specifically toward producing 
discoveries that enable and assist technology invention. Pre-invention science is specifically an 
intermediate product supplied to invention-producing firms, and it is a key input for both public and 
private producers. Relatively little pre-invention science is undertaken by the private sector; it is 
primarily the activities of scientists in universities, the government, and non-profit institutes. 
 Scientific communication within and between fields of science occur. However, each field of 
science has evolved so as to facilitate low cost and efficient exchange of ideas to meet acceptable 
standards of credibility. To facilitate exchanges within a field, scientists working in the area have 
developed specialized language and measurement procedures to achieve exactness and hence 
credibility. In most sciences, this is the language of statistics, experimental design and exact 
measurement (Huffman and Evenson 2006, pp. 55-56). Traditionally, scientists have specialized in 
research problems that are largely in one field but occasionally with not too distant horizontal 
linkages. Scientists have developed communication systems to facilitate primarily within a field of 
science and sometimes with a small amount of horizontal or vertical linkage. The journal articles, 
reference citations, specialized language, and elements of style are chiefly designed to allow scientist 
working on similar problems to disclose finding quickly and accurately to one another. This 
disclosure process facilitates refereeing of priority claims to new knowledge and accumulation of 
verified hypothesis, or the so-called scientific knowledge of a field (Committee on the Conduct of 
Science 1989, pp. 8-16). Vertical exchanges, upstream or downstream from their area of 
specialization, are less frequent and more problematic because of differences in language, accepted 
methods, and style. 
 The scientific exchange process that originated in Level VI sciences has been modified and 
used in Level V pre-invention sciences and even to some extent in Level IV activities. At all levels, 
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knowledge must be communicated and exchanged to facilitate the knowledge accumulation process 
and the building blocks construction of scientific advances. Scientific papers with their specialized 
language usually associated with a disciple and with standards set by scientists in the disciple, have 
been a useful vehicle for exchanges within a field and to an extent to horizontal exchange at all 
levels. Scientific papers have also served as a vehicle for vertical knowledge exchange, but some of 
the features of scientific papers that facilitate horizontal exchange can hinder vertical exchange. 
Language and style, for example, facilitate horizontal communication. But across fields and levels of 
science, they tend to differ significantly. Thus, they tend to hinder vertical exchange in papers and in 
collaboration across levels of science (Huffman and Evenson 2006, pp. 56). 
 Figure 1 also shows that four scientific pillars support innovations needed for agriculture—
physical sciences, chemical sciences, biological sciences and social sciences. The advances in 
physical sciences are built upon a foundation of mathematics and physics. In this column, pre-
invention sciences are clearly linked up-stream to the applied sciences of agricultural engineering and 
design, mechanics, and computer information, and software and downstream to pre-invention 
sciences.  Advances in chemical sciences are building a foundation on inorganic and organic 
chemistry. In this column, the pre-invention sciences—soil physics and chemistry, hydrology and 
water resources and climatology—are linked upstream to agricultural chemistry, soils and soils 
sciences, and irrigation. Advances in biological sciences build off of a foundation in biochemistry, 
microbiology, molecular biology, bacteriology, botany, genetics, zoology and ecology. The pre-
invention sciences in this column—plant physiology, plant genetics, phytopathology, entomology 
environmental sciences and bioinformatics—are linked to the applied science fields of agronomy, 
horticulture, plant breeding, animal science, animal breeding, animal nutrition, food processing and 
human nutrition. Advances in the social sciences build from foundations in economics, psychology 
and mathematics. The pre-invention sciences in this area—applied economics, probability, statistics 
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and econometrics, sociology and politically economy—are linked upstream to farm management and 
marketing, resource economics, rural sociology and public policy studies.  
 The new biology is attempting to undertake research organized as multidisciplinary projects 
with a primary emphasis on biological sciences (at all levels) but also incorporating chemical 
sciences, physical sciences—physics, mathematics, engineering, computer science—and social 
sciences, such as economics. Multidisciplinary research requires spanning long distance linkages in 
figure 1. This is important because language, style, and approaches to advancing science differ in 
important ways across these fields of science. Hence, not only is there a general free-rider problem 
that comes with team work of similarly training individuals but now there are additional transactions 
costs of scientists working together on a team project. This organization of projects has a potential to 
be quite productive but also quite inefficient at times—progress being unusually slow at times and 
problems with misunderstandings then may undermine the success of a project.   
Team Research and a Hierarchy of Scientists 
 Consider a research project that includes n tasks and n agents and one principal, and each 
agent chooses to allocate his effort, indexed by a dichotomous outcome: effort = 1(work), 0(shirk). 
Each agent is assigned major responsibility for one task. An agent’s task is completed with 
probability α if he “shirks” and with probability β(k) if he chooses “work” and believes that k (< n) 
other agents choose “work.” Thus, if agent i chooses “work,” the probability of completion of the task 
that he is primarily responsible for increases from α to β(k) > α. The cost of his effort level “work” is 
ci, and the agents (and principal) are assumed to be risk neutral so differential risk preferences do not 
enter choices here.  
 The effort decision of any agent is not directly observable to the principal and other (n-1) 
agents. This means that each agent’s effort choice is noncontractible, and the principal observes and 
each agent’s payoff depends only on the final outcome of the multitask project. The project can be 
either a “success” or a “failure.” If the project is a “failure” then all n agents obtain a zero payoff, but 
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if it is a “success,” there is a vector of expected payoffs, one to each agent: v = (v1, v2,.., vn). The 
vector v is the incentive mechanism, and every incentive mechanism gives rise to a sequence of n 
efforts decisions with outcomes of “work” or “shirk,” indexed as: effort = (effort1, effort2, …., effortn). 
We say that a mechanism v is incentive inducing (INI) if v indices all n agents to choose effort level 
“work” in equilibrium, i.e., effort =(work1, work2,…., workn) at minimum total payments to the n 
agents. This outcome is said to be a Nash equilibrium for this game (Winter 2004). 
 In particular, define v(k) as the payoff for the (k +1)-th agent,  (0 ≤ k ≤ n-1), that would make 
him indifferent between working and shirking, given that he believes that exactly k other agents also 
choose “work.” His expected payoff for “work” is v(k)α n[β(k+1)/α]k+1 – ck+1, whereas if he chooses 
to “shirk” his expected payoff is v(k)α n[β(k)/α]k. Hence, v(k*) equals 
(16)     v(k*) = ck+1/{α n-(k+1)β(k+1)k+1[1 - α /β(k)]}= ck+1/{α n[β(k+1)/ α ]k+1[1 - α /β(k)]}, 
 which is decreasing in k (Winter 2004). Then the optimal payment scheme v* is obtained by 
valuing (16) at k = 0, 1, 2, …, (n-1).  
 In equation (16), consider the case where the agents have identical cost of effort (ci = c), then 
it is clear that each agent faces a different expected payoff to his effort, and that the largest expected 
payoff is to the first agent, and the expected payoff declines as additional agents committee to “work” 
on the project. This follows from 0 ≤ α < β(0) < 1. The intuition behind the result is quite simple. If 
an agent’s effort induces a positive externality on the effectiveness of other agents’ effort, it is 
optimal to promise a higher pay off or reward to some agents so as to make the others confidently 
believe that these highly paid agents will work rather than shirk. This allows the principal to offer 
other agents substantially less.  Hence, the optimal incentive mechanism is an endogenous hierarchy 
of incentives. This strategy is related to the “divide and conquer” strategy of exclusionary contracts 
(Segal and Whinston 2000).  
 In this model, we can define a production technology p ={0,1,2,..,(n-1)}→[0,1] specifying the 
probability of the project being a “success” as a function of the number of agents who choose 
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“work.” A key property of p is that of increasing returns to scale (IRS). The technology is defined as 
IRS if p(k+1) – p(k) is increasing in k, k = 0, 1, …(n-1), which holds for α = [p(0)]1/n and β(k) = 
[p(k)/p(0)]1/k[p(0)]1/n.  Upon simplifying this expression, we obtain the probability of a project 
“success” if k agents choose to “work” (on the task for which they are primarily responsible) 
(17)    p(k) = [β(k)/α]kα n-k.  
p(k) > p(0) follows from α < β(k) for all k.  Winter (2004) has shown that increasing returns to scale 
(IRS) in β implies p has IRS for p(k) as defined in (17).   
 Full discrimination arises if an agent’s incentive to work increases with the number of other 
agents who choose “work.” This can be either a direct result of the technology’s properties or simply 
a consequence of the psychology of peer pressure. Hence, in an environment that exhibits 
externalities of the kind described above—divide and conquer—it will be optimal to provide each 
agent with a different incentive, even if the agents have the same cost of effort. This differential 
incentive scheme for agents, however, can take different forms. For example, these incentives 
frequently appear in the form of a hierarchy or ranking of agents when authority otherwise seems 
inconsequential to the outcome of the project.  
 Moreover, all agents must know that rewards/payoffs are differentiated by rank. One example 
is that only one team member assumes or volunteers to be the  “Project Head”, “Project Director,”  
“Project Manger,” or “Principal Investigator,” and others are designed “Scientists I” and “Scientist 
II.”3 Differential pay would also include different salary rates charged to the project, but also in 
academic research, a share of the institutional overhead on an externally funded project generally is 
returned to the project’s investigators. In my example, the Project Director would get the largest share 
of the overhead, Scientists I, the next largest share, and Scientist II the lowest share.  In the model 
                                                 
3Also, it has been shown that internal supervision across hierarchy layers shapes wage scales within many organizations 
(Lazear and Rosen 1981). 
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developed above, rank and hierarchy are instruments for generating differential incentives—agents 
who are assigned higher incentives are those placed at higher ranks.  
   Thus, an efficiently organized research project spanning several diverse disciplines and 
involving perhaps 5 to 10 total scientists will need to pay serious attention to setting differential 
incentives for work on the project. The role of the Project Direction or Principal Investigator will 
almost certainly be assigned to a senior scientist. This individual will need to have a set of attributes: 
(i) to have a well-established reputation for excellence in discovery (signally skill in discovery and 
general respect in his own discipline, (ii) prior experience working with and coordinating others in 
undertaking projects, and (iii) optimism about the potential for success of the project, as reflected in 
his willingness to work tirelessly on the project. Hence, junior scientists/faculty members would 
potentially fit into lower rank positions. However, a junior faculty member who is part of a large 
multi-disciplinary project may believe that the “success” and timely completion of the project is out 
of his control. This would be a plausible reason for junior faculty member/scientist to decline 
voluntary participation in such projects (but might be assigned involuntarily by the Department Chair 
to the project). After a faculty member achieving tenure, working in a hierarchy or ranked system 
may have an acceptable expected payoff.  Moreover, it opens up the possibilities for many new 
directions of future research. 
The Use of Relative versus Joint Performance Evaluation 
 Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Holmstrom (1982) have papers on team-based incentives in 
which they suggest that relative performance evaluation (RPE), such as agents organized in a team 
compete in a tournament, is an efficient contract under some conditions.4 RPE has value to the 
principal when agents face a common uncertainty or shock, e.g., the discovery of the electronic 
                                                 
4 This is true only for cases where agents are risk neutral. In the first section of this paper, I have reviewed the Huffman 
and Just (2000) results showing how risk agents affect optimal incentives for research. Scientists are most likely to be risk 
averse, but there may be selection into the professions such that scientists are only modestly risk averse due to selection 
operating a number of levels to eliminate the most risk averse. 
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digital computer, of the internet, of computer software spreadsheets and word processing. In this 
case, a tournament organized by a principal (and not by the agents) is recognized as having potential 
for easing the free-rider problem and creating relatively high powered short-run incentives.5 The 
reason is that competition is useful for revealing or extracting information from agents that would 
otherwise remain concealed (Holmstrom 1982). He shows that if agents’ outcomes are unrelated, 
pitting them against each other in rank-order tournaments will lead to worse performance than 
rewarding agents on the basis of their individual outcomes (or signals of effort alone). When agents 
are pitted against each other, there is more randomness in the payoff/reward system without any gains 
in the power of inference about agents’ effort. Hence, competition per se is does not have value. 
 Moreover, RPE is open to counterproductive behavior. In the short run, agents have an 
incentive to manipulate signals in an unproductive way, e.g., to undertake direct and indirect 
sabotage of other agents or team member’s efforts or exert excess peer pressure against “high 
performers.” Hence, there is a weak incentive for cooperation, including sharing useful information. 
For example, team members working on different parts of the project may not pass on important 
information in a timely fashion to other agents in the project. In a multi-period, repeated contracting 
the agents have an incentive to collude against the incentives by jointly slacking off or shirking. 
 However, we can gain some useful insights by assuming that principals and agents are risk 
neutral, agents are liquidity constraint such that they cannot be taxed up front for participating in a 
project and agents undertake one or more projects per period. In each period, each agent chooses 
effort(e) = work(1), shirk(0), and has ci as the cost of effort. The principal’s objective is to induce 
both agents to work but at a minimum total compensation.  
 Let an agent’s utility or expected wage not of cost of effort be 
(18)  U(ei| ej, K) = E(wi| ei, ej, K) - ci ei, i ≠ j, i, j = 1, 2; K = R, J,6 
                                                 
5 A rank-order tournament rewards agents merely on their performance rank, and not on the value of the output for the 
project itself (Lazear and Rosen 1981). 
6 I can allow for more than two agents but at a cost of making the notation more cumbersome. 
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so that the payoff to the i-th agent dependent on his and his partner’s effort under both Relative 
Performance Evaluation (R) and Joint Performance Evaluation (J). The principal has imperfect and 
independent signals about the effort levels of the two scientists.  With probability σ , a benevolent 
common shock strikes both agents (and the project) and with probability (1 - σ)  no common 
benevolent shock occurs. Some example of benevolent common shocks include the discovery of the 
electronic digital computer, discovery of the desktop and laptop computers, discovery of the internet, 
discovery of the structure of DNA, discovery of computer software for data analysis and word-
processing.  If no common shock occurs, then the principal’s information come only from signals 
about effect levels of the agents, “effort” ei, which occurs with probability iep , 0 ≤ iep ≤ 1, pi1 > 0.5 > 
pi0 , and the principal receives a signal of “work” for the i-th agent of pi1, which is assumed to be 
larger than one-half, and a signal of “shirk” of pi 0 <  pi1, i = 1,2.  Let ji ssw be the wage that the 
principal pays to the i-th agent when the principal receives signal (si , sj), each of which a value of 
1(work) or 0(shirk).  
 With two agents there is a combination of four realizations of signals that the principal might 
receive on the two agents. For the i-th agent, the combinations of wages associated with these signals 
is wi  
(19)  wi = { iiii wwww 00011011 ,,, }, i = 1, 2. 
Then the expected wage for the i-th agent is 
(20) E(wi | ei, ej, K) = σ iw11  + (1-σ)[ pi1 pj1 iw11  + pi1(1- pj1) iw10  + (1- pi1) pj1 iw01 + (1- pi1)(1- pj1) iw00 ] 
Note that if there is no common shock, i.e., σ = 0, then the first term on the right-hand side of (20) 
drops out of the expression, and the expected wage is dependent on the probability of the principal 
receiving a signal of “work,” indexed by a 1, and of “shirk,” indexed by a 0, on both agents.
 Following Chen and Yoo (20010), a wage scheme exhibits JPE if (w11, w01) > (w10, w00). In 
this case, E(wi| ei,1, J)  > E(wi| ei, 0, J) or the expected wage for the i-th agent is always higher when 
his partner works than when he shirks. Thus, an agent’s decision to work yields positive externalities 
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to his partner’s effort decision. The nature of the interaction of agents’ effort is that they are 
cooperative; they work together, share information and fill-in temporarily for lagging members.  The 
advantages of this type payoff scheme increases as we shift from a one-time relationship to a multi-
period, repeated contracting relationship. In contrast, a wage scheme exhibits RPE if (w11, w01) < 
(w10, w00). In this case, E(wi| ei,1, R) < E(wi| ei, 0, R), or the expected wage of an agent is lower when 
his partner works than when he shirks. In this case, the partner generates a negative externality.  In 
this setting, agents are uncooperative; they do not share information, engage in negative helping or 
sabotage, and do no fill-in for temporarily lagging team mates.  
 First, a benchmark needs to be established, which is an environment of one-period decision 
making.  An incentive scheme induces both agents to work as a Nash equilibrium if 
 
(ICs)     E(w| 1,1, K) – c  ≥ E(w| 0,1, K).7 
The left hand side of (ICs) is the expected wage to the i-th agent when both agent chooses to work net 
of the cost of effort and it is greater or equality to the expected payoff to the i-th agent when he 
shirks, given that his partner chooses to work. Hence, the principal’s problem is 
(R)     
0
min≥w E(w| 1,1, K)  subject to (ICs). 
This solution has wide-ranging possible outcomes (Che and Yoo 2001). However, the optimal static 
(single period) wage scheme for each agent is RPE such that   
(21)  wR = {0, Rw10 , 0, 0},  
Rw10 = c /[(1-σ)( p1 - p0)(1- p1)]. 
An agent chooses to work even though he knows that his partner will shirk with positive probability. 
Given that the two agents can changes roles of being the i-th or j-th agent, they both in equilibrium 
choose “work.” Hence, in the framework developed in this section of the paper relative performance 
evaluation (RPE) is preferred in a one-time contracting relationship.  Some attributes of (21) are 
                                                 
7 The agent subscripts (i, j) are not necessary and are suppressed in the remainder of this section. 
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readily apparent. A higher cost of effort, higher probability of a common technology shock, 
probability of choosing “work” all increase the wage under JPE. 
 In multi-period, repeated relationship, new opportunities in contracting arise. First, RPE 
becomes generally less attractive because the agents have an incentive to collude against the payment 
scheme by jointly slacking off or shirking. Second, JPE becomes more attractive because as agents 
observe past of their partner, they can punish bad behavior. For example, if one agent should choose 
to shirk in the first period, his partner has the opportunity to punish him in future periods by shirking, 
too. This possibility helps police the tendency for shirking in the first place.    
 Let a history at time t = 1, 2,.. be a sequence of effort decisions made by the two agents up to  
t – 1. Then a strategy profile is a sequence of functions that map from any possible history at each 
period into a probability distribution over effort choice profiles at that period. With two agents, we 
are most interested in a multi-period, repeated relationship over an infinite horizon (e1, e2)∞. 
 Lets fix an agent at his wage scheme w ≥ 0. By shirking, the agent can guarantee a payoff of 
at least min{E(w| 0,0, K), E(w| 0,1, K)}in each period. Hence, this is a lower bound for the worst 
payoff sustainable in any equilibrium of the game. Therefore, for an equilibrium in which both agents 
work, we must have 
(ICL)  E(w| 1, 1, K) - c ≥ (1 - δ) E(w| 0,1, K)  +  δ min{E(w| 0,0, K), E(w| 0,1, K)}. 
The left-hand side of (ICL) represents the average present-discounted value payoff from working—
the expected wage net of the cost of effort. On the right-hand side, a weighted average of the 
expected wage to the i-th agent, given that he knows that his partner will shirk with positive 
probability and the minimum sustainable payoff. Here δ is the discount factor; zero corresponds to a 
one-period horizon, and as δ gets larger, greater weight is given to the future, but with an upper 
bound on δ of one. Hence, the weighting factor on the first term on the right-hand side declines as the 
length of the relationship increase and on the second term rises are the length of the project increases. 
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Inspection of (ICL) shows why JPE may be more effective than RPE—it permits exploiting the 
strategic interaction among the agents in a repeated relationship.  
 Under JPE, E(w| 0,1, J) > E(w| 0,0, J). 
Thus, (ICL) becomes 
(ICL’)  E(w| 1, 1, J) - c ≥ (1 - δ) E(w| 0,1, J)  +  δ E(w| 0,0, J). 
Since E(w| 0,1, J) > E(w| 0,0, J), i.e., the expected wage when the partner works and the agent does 
not is larger than when they both shirk. The implication is that a shirking team member can be more 
severely punished by his partner in a repeated or multi-period relationship. The reason is that he is 
not just punished by a lowered chance of obtaining the good signal (the static incentive) but also 
punished by the subsequent shirking of his partner in the future, which lowers the initial shirker’s 
future expected payoff. Thus, the agents assist the principal with enforcement of the cont contract 
when this behavior is self-enforcing behavior. In contrast, RPE cannot generate implicit incentives 
(Che and Yoo 2001).8   
 The optimal wage scheme in multi-period repeat contracting is obtained from 
(L)  
0
min≥w E(w| 1,1, K) s.t. (ICL).        
Then define 
∧δ (σ) =  σ / [(1 - σ)p1p0 ] where ∧δ (σ) ≤ δ ≤ 1, and the solution to (L) is the JPE scheme  
(22)   wJ  = { 0,0,0,11
Jw }, Jw11 = c /[(1-σ)( 21p  - (1 - δ) p1p0 - δ 20p )],  
where both agents work in every period (work, work)∞, a long-term team equilibrium exists. In 
contrast, if 0 ≤ δ ≤ ∧δ (σ), including δ = 0, then the solution to (L) is RPE as in wR.  Hence, the value 
of δ is quite critical to the type of incentive scheme that is optimal.  
                                                 
8 Consider any RPE scheme where E(w| 0,0, R) > E(w| 0,1, R), then E(w| 1, 1, R) – c = E(w| 0,1, R). This implies that 
RPE is at least as costly to implement in the repeated setting as in one-time contracting. 
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 Since (22) is a JPE scheme, E(w| 0,1, J) > E(w| 0,0, J), and, hence,                                    
min{E(w| 0,0, J), E(w| 0,1, J)} = E(w| 0,0, J), so the worst possible equilibrium punishment is 
attained when both workers shirk every period in future, (shirk, shirk)∞, under wJ. In particular, Che 
and Yoo (2001) show that this is self-enforcing given (22). In other words, (shirk, shirk) is a stage-
game Nash equilibrium, which implies that its repeated play forms a subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
Thus, the worst possible sustainable punishment in this case is self-enforcing under (22). Since (22) 
satisfies the constraint of (L), repeated play of (work, work) is subgame perfect given the threat of 
such a punishment. Furthermore, (22) has a virtue of being collusion-proof: (work, work)∞ yields a 
higher joint payoff to the agents than all other possible subgame-perfect equilibria, e.g., agents are 
better off when they both “work” than when they both “shirk.” Also, the joint payoff is higher when 
both agents choose “work” than when one of them chooses “shirk” and the other chooses “work.” 
Hence, under JPE, each agent’s work confers positive externalities on his team member’s work, and 
in the implemented equilibrium, these positive externalities are already realized. Thus, the two agents 
of the team cannot benefit from colluding against the JPE multi-period, repeated contracting scheme, 
and the JPE scheme, wJ implements (work, work)∞ as a team equilibrium.  
 Furthermore, there exists a 
∧δ ′(σ) ≤ ∧δ (σ) such that the above JPE scheme is optimal for 
∧δ ′(σ) ≤ δ ≤ 1. Since ∧δ (σ) is increasing in σ, the JPE scheme is optimal for generally small values of 
σ and large values of δ, as displaced in figure 2. In particular, the figure is divided into two regions; 
one where JPE is optimal and another where RPE is optimal. There is a large area in the NE part of 
the graph where JPE is optimal. In contrast, the area where RPE is optimal is optimal is small.  A 
major reason for this is that under repeated contracting (i.e., large δ), it is costly for the principal to 
police the incentive of the agents to collude against the incentive scheme by jointly slacking off or 
shirking.  
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 Returning to JPE, the optimal scheme in (22) can be implemented by a single group or team 
output signal rather than by separate signals of effort for each agent in the team. However, for a 
single team signal to be optimal, it must adequately aggregate the individual signals (about effort). 
Let signal S = min{ei , ej}, then the optimal joint performance evaluation can be implemented if the 
principal’s payoff to each agent of a wage equal to Jw11 S, i.e., each is paid either 
Jw11  or 0. 
 One can measure the intensity of an incentive scheme for work by comparing E(w| 1,1, K) - 
E(w| 0,1, K), the expected net-payoff to an agent when he chooses “work” rather than “shirk,” given 
that his partner chooses to work. Under the static optimal scheme of RPE, wR, (ICR) binds, so that 
E(w| 1,1, R) - E(w| 0,1, R) = c. With the optimal JPE scheme, wJ, E(w| 1,1, J) - E(w| 0,1, J) = p1 c / (p1 
+ δ p0) < c. Hence, the principal’s optimal incentive for agent’s effort is lower powered under the 
optimal JPE scheme. In particular, the power of the incentive falls discontinuously as δ increases 
because of a shift from RPE being optimal to JPE being optimal. Moreover, it falls further from the 
fact the team relations is expected to last many periods. 
 The intuition behind the lower-powered incentives and JPE evaluation compared to RPE are 
of two types. First, the explicit incentive does not have to be too high powered to motivate an agent to 
work, given the presences of additional implicit incentives. Second, the explicit incentive must be 
sufficiently low powered for shirking to be a credible punishment strategy when a partner shirks. 
Moreover, given the assumption that the principal has no memory in repeated relationship with the 
two team members, it is an equilibrium strategy for the principal to offer wJ every period. This does 
mean that the principal always has a zero prior for shirking even after repeated events of shirking by 
agents. Hence, the principal interprets this sequence of negative signals as just bad luck.9 
                                                 
9 Mohnen et al. (2008) have shown that in settings when agents cannot monitor each others efforts, total effort increases if 
the agents periodically provide reports to each other (at group meetings) about the state of their progress at interim stages 
before the project is completed. In contrast, with the absence of interim information exchanges among agents, significant 
shirking will occur. They argue that his outcome is driven at least partially by the fact that agents have inequity aversion 
on effort devoted to a project that has two or more reporting periods.  Hence, there may be a payoff to regular meetings of 
agents working on different tasks in a team research project. 
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Synergy among Team Members 
 Should more than one scientist be assigned to a task? A advantage of team production arises 
when there is a synergy among the team members, i.e., joint task assignment is an optimal job design. 
The task can either “succeed” or “fail” with gross payoffs to the principal of R > 0 and 0, 
respectively. However, a principal has a choice of assigning only one agent to a task or two (or more) 
agents. It is well known that if there is no synergy, then two agents should not be assigned to one 
task. Holmstrom (1981) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) conclude that two or more agents 
should not be made jointly responsible for a single task because sharing responsibility increases the 
total risk that each agent faces of successfully completing the task without increasing the expected 
payoff. In addition, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) recommend that tasks be grouped together based 
on the cost of measuring and rewarding performance. Some agents should be assigned easy-to-
measure tasks, and their pay should be contingent on performance or incentive pay (see first section 
of paper), but other agents should be assigned hard-to-measure tasks and be rewarded by a fixed 
wage. The reason being that if an agent has both easy and hard-to-measure tasks, he or she will 
concentrate on the easy-to-measure tasks at the expense of the hard-to-measure tasks. 
 Clearly many research projects consist of a sequence of multiple tasks that need to be 
completed in order for the project to be a “success.” Let’s assume that in the case of single agent 
production, an agent makes a choice of effort e = 0, 1, 2 at a cost of c⋅ e, which implies that the 
marginal cost of effort (c) is constant and not increasing. The task succeeds with probability pe, where 
1 > p2 > p1 > p0. The highest probability of the task being a success occurs if the agent allocated two 
units of effort to the task, and the probability drops as one than then finally zero units of effort are 
allocated to the task. Furthermore, assume that p2+ p0 ≥ 2 p1, i.e., the probability of the project being 
a success if the agent allocates two units of effort and zero units of effort is greater than if two agents 
allocate one unit of effort. This condition ensures that an agent will never choose one unit of effort. 
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We also assume that R is sufficiently large that the principal finds it optimal to induce the agent to 
choose two units of effort, which is denoted as “work” (verses “shirk”). 
 Now, consider an alternative technology where two agents or a team is assigned to the same 
task. Each agent either chooses “work” or “shirk” where the cost of working is c and of shirking is 0. 
The task is either a “success” or “failure,” which is the only signal going to the principal, i.e., not 
indicators of effort for individual agents, and the principal sets the wage scheme for each agent based 
on whether the project succeeds or fails. The probability of project “success” with two agents is 
denoted eeip , where 1 > p11 > p10 =  p01 ≥  p00 ≥  0. 
The interpretation is that the lowest probability of a project succeeding occurs when both agents 
shirk. If one agent work and one agent shirts, the probability of success of the project is higher than if 
they both shirk. However, the highest probability of the project being successful occurs when both 
agents work on the project. 
 Furthermore, let’s assume that p10 > p0, so that the project is more likely to succeed when a 
team of two is assigned to the task than when it is assigned to one agent who “shirks.” Also, assume 
that  
(23)   p11 + p00  ≥ 2 p01.  
Condition (23) implies that an agent’s work tends to increase his partner’s productivity gain from 
working. Again assume that R is large enough that it is optimal for the principal to induce both agents 
to choose “work,” and the principal wants to implement the same aggregate amount of effort in both 
regimes. Furthermore, a team has synergy on a task if p11 > p2. Hence, team production is more 
productive than single agent production, assuming that the agent(s) work in both cases. Moreover, we 
define that a team member engages in “negative helping” or sabotage of a task when p00 < p0, the 
success of a project is low when a team of two agents shirks than if on a single agent is assigned to 
 32
the task and shirks.10 Also, defined the extent to which an agent’s productivity depends on the effort 
decision of his partner as  Δe = pe1 - pe0. Then a measure of technological independence between the 
agents effort under team production can be denoted as (Δ0, Δ1). Hence, the higher (Δ0, Δ1), the more 
interdependent is the technology of production. 
 The choice of single agent versus team production is now clear. Let w ≥ 0 denote the 
principal’s payoff to an agent when the project succeeds. Clearly the payoff would be zero when the 
project is a “failure”(or agents shirk). First, consider single agent production. Given this scheme, an 
agent will choose two units of effort rather than zero if p2 w – 2c ≥  p0w. The minimum payoff is then 
(24)   w* = 2 c /( p2 - p0).  
Given this payoff, the agent chooses two units of effort, and principal’s net expected payoff is  
(25)   p2 R -  2 p2 c /( p2 - p0). 
Second, under team production, an agent will work if  
(26)   p11 w – c ≥  p01w. 
A team equilibrium is now optimal, and the optimal incentive wage is 
(27)   W* = c /( p11 - p01), 
which results in the following net payoff to the principal 
(28)   p11R – 2 p11W* =  p11R – 2 p11c/( p11 - p01). 
Comparing (25) and (28), it is clear that the synergy among the team members is necessary for team 
assignment to a task to be optimal in a one period, static relationship, i.e., the principal prefers 
individual production to team production if the team has no synergy, team production does not 
produce more than single agent production— p11 ≤ p2. To gain additional insight, assume that         
p11 = p2, then a team produces with two workers, each with one unit of effort, which the same amount 
of total effort as a single agents investing two units of his effort. Yet the principal will choose single 
                                                 
10 Itoh (1991) considers agents who are part of a team project where each agent is given primary responsibility for one 
task, but each may also engage in helping other agents with their task(s). The non-specialization of task structure leads to 
team production as an optimal outcome proved that “negative helping,” or sabotage does not occur (Lazear 1989). 
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agent production because the incentive cost is higher in team production due to fixed costs associated 
with providing incentives for each agent.  With team production, a wage used to motivate an agent’s 
effort simply confers positive externalities to his partner without generating the latter’s incentive for 
effort. With single-agent production, the wage used to motivate the first unit of effort for an agent 
will have a spillover effect onto his second unit of his effort. Hence, to provide the same incentives in 
team production, the principal must pay a larger total payoff to the two agents than what he would 
need to pay one agent to perform two units of work.  
 However, in a multi-period, long-term relationship, team production on a task is more 
attractive. The outcome for single agent production remains unchanged as it is replayed in each 
subsequent period. However, the outcome for team output changes because of the strategic 
interaction among the team members. Now consider the strategy of each agent: “start and keep 
playing “work” unless an agent shirks in a previous period, in which case both “shirk” repeatedly 
thereafter.” This penalty strategy generates the worst sustainable payoff for each agent. 
 For this strategy to sustain itself, two conditions must hold. First, it must be self-enforcing for 
both agents to choose “shirk” repeatedly, which holds if it is a stage-game Nash equilibrium for each 
agent to shirk: p00w ≥ p01w – c, or 
(29)  w ≥ W*(δ) = c / [p11 – (1 - δ) p01 - δ p00]. 
Given condition (23), W*(δ) is the lowest payoff that implements (work, work)∞ as a team 
equilibrium. Hence, W*(δ) is the optimal level of incentive payoff to agents. The resulting expected 
payoff to the principal is 
(30)  p11 R - 2 p11 c / [p11 – (1 - δ) p01 - δ p00]. 
 Comparing (30) and (23), we see that p01 in the denominator of (23) is replaced by an 
expression that is smaller, (1 - δ) p01 + δ p00. The new element in (30) is the p00, which is attributed to 
the dynamic penalty strategy of the agents. Consequently, it is less costly for the principal to motivate 
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an agent in the multi-period, repeated environment that in a single period, static environment as long 
as δ > 0 because W*(δ) < W*.  Moreover, the denominator of (30) can be written as Δ1 + δΔ0. Thus, 
team production becomes more favorable as the technology of production becomes more 
interdependent in agent’s effort. 
 In conclusion, team production on a task with payoffs to each agent of W*(δ) implements            
(work, work)∞ as a team equilibrium. If p11 > p2, i.e., the team has synergy and                                  
p11 – (1 - δ) p01 - δ p00 ≥ p2 - p0, then the principal prefers team production to individual agent 
production on a particular task in multi-period, repeated production. Alternatively, if p11 < p2 
and  p11 – (1 - δ) p01 - δ p00 <  p2 - p0, the principal prefers individual agent assignment to a task rather 
than team production. Clearly, the incentives for team production requires a weaker set of conditions 
to hold in a multi-period, repeated relationships than in single period, static settings. The term p00, 
probability that the project is a success if both agents shirk, does not have any role in a single period, 
static relationship. When p00 < p0 or sabotage-type activities occur (when two agents are assigned to a 
task and both shirks, the probability of success of the project is lower than when only one agent is 
assigned to a project and he shirks), the potential for sabotage in the future can be used to sustain a 
cooperative future relationship among agents. It makes the mutual sanctioning power of shirking in 
the future more credible and effective. This result supports related research that has concluded that a 
team assignment to a task is optimal in an organization when there is internal monitoring and peer 
pressure to enforce “work.”11 
 The model developed in this section shows that relative performance evaluation, as in 
tournaments, may be optimal in settings of one-period contacting for a project, provided the agents 
are not too risk averse. This means incentives create competition among agents in a team.  However, 
                                                 
11 When agents are risk averse rather than risk neutral, team production becomes less attractive. For example, Corts 
(2007) shows that when there is a multi-task problem and production is stochastic, then individual production is preferred 
to teams if agents are highly risk-averse.  Individual accountability is preferred to team accountability. Given that women 
are generally more risk averse than men, team research would have the effect of discriminating against women. 
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individual members of a team project face weak incentives to cooperate—reducing the probability of 
the project being a success. This setting describes scientist-participation in external funding agency 
relationships, which are relatively infrequent events. In contrast, block grants to the scientists’ 
institutions for such diverse research could create an environment where multi-period repeated 
contracting occurs under a more favorable organizational setting. A team equilibrium becomes more 
likely in this setting, which implies less competition among agents, more cooperation, and weaker 
incentives. Hence, the team structure may be better suited to research managed by institutions that 
employ the scientists and not for research projects funded by external agencies.  
 With a research project requiring expertise from multiple disciplines, efforts of diversely 
trained scientists have the potential to be synergenic. However, this has value primarily in multi-
period, repeated relationships. This does not in general represent reasonable expectations in the 
externally funding research environment.  
Status, Cognitive Bias and Incentives 
 Frequently, individuals do not have an accurate assessment of their status relative to that of 
others. Although social status does not have an inherent effect on worker productivity, low status 
individuals tend to underestimate their competence and underperform in a group task when paired 
with high-status individuals, who display over confidence in their abilities. In teams of agents with 
different, low-status agents, they have a weak incentive to perform in activities that are status worthy. 
Because principals do not know the status of their team members or cannot operate on it because of 
anti-discrimination laws, asymmetric information on social status in a group leads to incentive 
problems for the principal. In particular, the principal must offer all agents in a team the same 
contract.    
 Oxoby (2002) shows that if agents have status-biased distortions in their beliefs, a principal 
should use JPE or team-based incentives. An agent’s social rank affects his or her perceptions 
regarding the role of sending a positive signal to the principal about effort. While the principal faces 
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the objective probabilities of effort contingent on signals of effort, agents’ beliefs are distorted by 
status effects, and these beliefs affect behavior on a project. The issue is that agents react to 
subjective beliefs about signals rather than objective beliefs. In his model, when agents have biased 
beliefs about status, than RPE and team incentives are optimal. The main issue here is that when 
agents have biased beliefs, it takes a large payoff to the low-status agent to induce effort on the 
project. Moreover, status-induced biases may also affect the assignment of tasks within a team. More 
confident agents may more easily fall into leadership roles in which they delegate tasks or assume a 
larger share of the duties. These assignments may result from over-confidence in one’s abilities but 
also from an attempt to garner more “status worthy duties.”  
 Furthermore, this approach highlights a strategic aspect of team assignments in which a 
principal may put together teams or assign tasks to exploit the status induced biases of agents. It may 
be easier for a principal to motivate some individuals in the presence of lower-status agents, and the 
principal may want to organize teams to exploit status differences. In particular, several studies have 
found gender differences in risk aversion; men being less risk averse than women. Hence, men and 
women may respond differently to research and other types of job-related risk. Alternatively, if 
agents do not make errors in beliefs about social status, a relative performance (RPE) contract may be 
optimal. 
Conclusion 
 A provision in the 2008 Farm Bill established the National Institute for Food and Agriculture. 
Within this institute, a new competitive grant research program named the Agriculture and Food 
Research Initiative has replaced the National Research Initiative Competitive Grant Program. The 
Secretary of Agricultural has recently drawn attention to a new research emphasis for NIFA: food 
production and sustainability, improved nutrition and ending child obesity, food safety, biofuels and 
energy, climate change and the environment. In addition, a new NRC-NAS report on “A New Biology 
for the 21st Century” has shed light on using the new biology to meet societal challenges in food, 
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environment, energy and health. The essence of these events is that new NIFA competitive grants 
may focus more heavily on the new biology, with an emphasis on multidisciplinary teams of 
scientists in larger projects for longer period of time. However, team research raises complex 
organizational and incentive issues. 
 When a single agent undertakes a single research project and there is a random component to 
the transformation of agent’s effort into project output, there is no way for a principal or project 
director to contract on a scientist’s effort or project output. The main problem is that the contract is 
unenforceable by the courts or a third-party arbitrator. However, the principal and agent can engage 
in a incentive compatible implicit contract—one when the marginal expect return to scientific effort 
exceed its expected cost and one where the agent’s payoff exceeds his reservation utility or best 
alternative use of his time. However, a scientist’s productivity also depends on his ability, risk 
aversion, cost of effort and reservation utility. Even when the principal has full knowledge of these 
latter attributes, setting an efficient incentive for effort is a challenge.   
 The optimal contract is linear in the effort of the scientist, containing a fixed wage (guarantee) 
and an incentive component (or share of the project output). Major implications include that the 
guaranteed salary is positively related to his reservation utility, but his reservation utility has no 
impact on the incentive component of pay. In addition, the optimal incentive rate is negatively related 
to scientist’s risk premium, and the optimal salary or pay guarantee is positively related to the 
scientists risk premium under plausible conditions. Moreover, an increase in the riskiness of research, 
e.g., reduced certainty of funding, reduces a scientist’s effort and size of the expected payoff to the 
project director or funding agency. Hence, creating greater competition for research funds and 
lowering the funding rate for new projects can be counter productive for scientists and funding 
agencies. 
 Research with a team of scientists raises free-rider problems but a project consisting of a 
research team that spans a number of disciplines have additional costs associated with effective and 
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efficient communication. These problems translate into additional fixed costs of research, which 
weigh heavily against one-time projects, which are the norm in externally funded research. However, 
they are less of a burden for tenured scientists employed by an established research institution, such 
as a state agricultural experiment station that has steady funding from block grants from external 
sources, e.g., federal and/or state governments.  
 If a research project has multiple tasks and one scientist is assigned primary (or exclusive) 
responsibility for it, and the success of the project requires the successful completion of each task in 
the project, then there is a vector of optimal payoffs to the scientists in the research team. The optimal 
set of incentives is one where the first scientist to commit to the project receives the highest expected 
payoff, the second to commit gets the second highest expected payoff, etc. The reason is that the 
commitment of the first one or two scientists to the project creates a positive externality on the 
successful completion of the project—it induces a positive externality on the effectiveness of other 
scientists who commit later. Hence, it is optimal to promise a higher payoff to some scientists so as to 
make the others confidently believe that these highly paid agents will work hard to make the project a 
success rather than to shirk. Hence, the optimal incentive mechanism in this setting is an endogenous 
hierarchy of incentive. 
 In fact, those with highest pay should be assigned highest rank in the research team. The 
implication is that the title of Project Directors will be assigned to a senior scientist, one who has a 
well established reputation for excellence in discovery, prior experience working with and 
coordinating others, and one who has boundless enthusiasm about the potential success of the 
project’s objectives. Junior scientists without tenure are unlikely to volunteer to participate in such 
projects. 
 The decision of the principal to use relative versus joint performance evaluation of team 
members is important to the success of a project. Relative performance evaluation (a tournament) 
among team members may be optimal in a one-time research relationship. Problems with this scheme 
 39
are that incentives are weak for cooperation—best to withhold relevant information, and to be 
generally uncooperative. Clearly this is problematic, especially for long-term relationships. In a long-
term relationship, spanning multiple periods, and with noisy translation of scientists’ effort into 
project success, joint performance evaluation, such as sharing the project’s payoff has major 
advantages. Under the latter incentive scheme, the optimal incentive for scientists’ effort is lower 
powered, and team members have an incentive to cooperate, including helping one another and 
sharing information. With long-term, repeated contracting, diligent scientists can punish a shirking 
team member by shirking themselves in the future. This mechanism of internal-enforcement of effort 
reduces the costs to the principal of team research. 
 Should more than one scientist be assigned to a task? This can be optimal if the team of 
scientists has synergy of their efforts. Although a multi-disciplinary research team has the potential 
for synergy of efforts, in a one-time relationship there is low probability that it will be optimal to 
assign a team of scientists to a single task, but it can occur if the efforts of these scientists have 
synergy. However, if the scientists can secure funding for a long-term repeated relationship, the 
probability of team assignment to a single task increases dramatically.  
 External social status of scientists can undermine the success of team research. Problems arise 
when subjective beliefs about social status affect agents’ decisions to “work” or “shirk.”  The 
incentive problem here is that it takes a large payoff to the “low status” scientist to induce “work.” 
Given that a number of studies have shown that women are more risk averse than men for almost all 
types of uncertain outcomes, female and male scientists are likely to respond differently to research 
risk. A likely prediction is that women will be reluctant to volunteer to participate in team research.  
 A very important conclusion is that competition among scientists has value only to the extent 
that it is used to reveal information; competition per se raises the uncertainty that scientists face in 
undertaking research. This translates into higher costs of research and reduced effort of risk averse 
scientists. 
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                             Figure 2. Regions of Optimal Joint Performance Evaluation (JPE) and Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE),  
                                assuming w01 = w00 = 0, p0 = 0.4 and p1 = 0.8. Figure adapted from Che and Yoo (2001) 
 
 
